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This paper examines the behavior of real GDP (levels and growth rates), unemployment, inflation,
bank credit, and real estate prices in a twenty one-year window surrounding selected adverse global
and country-specific shocks or events.  The episodes include the 1929 stock market crash, the 1973
oil shock, the 2007 U.S. subprime collapse and fifteen severe post-World War II financial crises. The
focus is not on the immediate antecedents and aftermath of these events but on longer horizons that
compare decades rather than years.  While evidence of lost decades, as in the depression of the 1930s,
1980s Latin America and 1990s Japan are not ubiquitous, GDP growth and housing prices are significantly
lower and unemployment higher in the ten-year window following the crisis when compared to the
decade that preceded it.  Inflation is lower after 1929 and in the post-financial crisis decade episodes
but notoriously higher after the oil shock. We present evidence that the decade of relative prosperity
prior to the fall was importantly fueled by an expansion in credit and rising leverage that spans about
10 years; it is followed by a lengthy period of retrenchment that most often only begins after the crisis
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I.  Introduction 
 
  Three years have elapsed since the troubles in the United States subprime 
mortgage market erupted in the summer of 2007.  In the interim, a global panic 
developed and, just as normalcy began to return this year, concerns about a Greek default 
and widespread contagion in Europe shook the confidence of financial markets anew.  As 
the dust has once again begun to settle, policymakers and financial market participants 
have begun to ponder the economic effects of these adverse shocks beyond their 
immediate and evident costs. 
Critical to those considerations are the intermediate- and longer-term effects of 
severe economic dislocations, which potentially matter for spending behavior, aggregate 
supply growth, asset pricing, fiscal budget prospects, and inflation determination.  To 
shed light on these matters, this paper examines the behavior of real GDP (both levels 
and growth rates), unemployment, inflation, bank credit, and real estate prices in a 
twenty-one-year window surrounding various adverse global and country-specific 
shocks.   
The events of the past three years are not without precedent.  However, those 
precedents are spread across countries and over time.  Two features, in particular, appear 
to have made the global economic contraction more virulent.  First, financial 
intermediation was dealt a body blow.  Financial institutions slashed new lending, and 
some markets were seriously impaired for a time.  Second, the declines in output were 
synchronous across many countries.  Virtually every country reporting export values   2
posted significant drops in the fourth quarter of 2008, and fully one-half of 182 countries 
recorded outright declines in real GDP in 2009.
1  
To capture both aspects, we examine fifteen severe post-World War II financial 
crises in advanced and emerging economies and three synchronous global contractions, 
the Great Contraction after the 1929 stock market crash, the 1973 oil shock, and the 2007 
U.S. subprime collapse. 
Our main results can be summarized as follows:    
Real per capita GDP growth rates are significantly lower during the decade 
following severe financial crises and the synchronous world-wide shocks.  The median 
post-financial crisis GDP growth decline in advanced economies is about 1 percent. 
2 
What singles out the Great Depression, however, is not a sustained slowdown in 
growth (which was smaller than that after the 1973 oil shock) as much as a massive initial 
output decline.  In about half of the advanced economies in our sample, the level of real 
GDP remained below the 1929 pre-crisis level from 1930 to 1939.
3  During the first three 
years following the 2007 U.S. subprime crisis (2008-2010), median real per capita GDP 
income levels for all the advanced economies is about 2 percent lower than it was in 
2007; this is comparable to the median output declines in the first three years after the 
fifteen severe post World War II financial crises.  However, 82 percent of the 
observations for per capita GDP during 2008 to 2010 remain below or equal to the 2007 
income level. The comparable figure for the fifteen crises episodes is 60 percent, 
                                                 
1 See the first table in Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) for a century-long perspective on exports around crises. 
2 The five advanced economy crises are: Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991), 
and Japan (1992). 
3 See the discussion in chapter 14 of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  The advanced economy group for the 
1929 and 1973 comparisons is comprised of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.  The 2007 analysis also includes Iceland.   3
indicating that during the current crisis episode recessions have been deeper, more 
persistent, and widespread. 
4 
In the ten-year window following severe financial crises, unemployment rates are 
significantly higher than in the decade that preceded the crisis. The rise in unemployment 
is most marked for the five advanced economies, where the median unemployment rate is 
about 5 percentage points higher.  In ten of the fifteen post-crisis episodes, 
unemployment has never fallen back to its pre-crisis level, not in the decade that 
followed nor through end-2009. 
Real housing prices for the full period is available for ten of the fifteen financial 
crisis episodes.  For this group, over an eleven-year period (encompassing the crisis year 
and the decade that followed), about 90 percent of the observations show real house 
prices below their level the year before the crisis.  Median housing prices are 15 to 20 
percent lower in this eleven-year window, with cumulative declines as large as 55 
percent.  The observations on unemployment and house prices, of course, may be related, 
as a protracted slump in construction activity that accompanies depressed housing prices 
may help to explain persistently higher unemployment. 
Another important driver of the cycle is the leverage of the private sector.  In the 
decade prior to a crisis, domestic credit/GDP climbs about 38 percent and external 
indebtedness soars. 
5  Credit/GDP declines by an amount comparable to the surge (38 
percent) after the crisis.  However, deleveraging is often delayed and is a lengthy process 
lasting about seven years.  The decade that preceded the onset of the 2007 crisis fits the 
                                                 
4 Using a very different approach from that adopted here, Laeven and Valencia (2010) reach the same 
conclusion about the severity of the output consequences of the recent episodes versus earlier post-World 
War II crises.   
5 This boom in lending/borrowing is importantly fed by large capital inflows (i.e., borrowing from the rest 
of the world) as documented in Mendoza and Terrones (2008) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2008).   4
historic pattern.  If deleveraging of private debt follows the tracks of previous crises as 
well, credit restraint will damp employment and growth for some time to come. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II briefly describes our empirical strategy, 
although most of the methodological details are reserved for an appendix.  Section III 
focuses on the performance of income levels and growth in the decades preceding and 
following fifteen severe financial crises in advanced and emerging economies; it also 
presents comparisons to the global (or, more accurately, advanced economies) crisis that 
began in 2007.  The emphasis is on testing the hypothesis that there are significant 
differences in the decades preceding and following crises that go beyond the more 
immediate boom-bust pattern. The cyclical behavior of credit, external debt, and housing 
prices over twenty-one–year windows supplements this analysis.  Section IV examines 
the prior episodes of severe and synchronous economic contraction, the 1929 stock 
market crash and the 1973 oil shock.  Section V examines the post-crisis inflation 
performance, and some of the policy implications of our findings are taken up in the brief 
concluding section. 
 
II. Empirical Strategy 
The simplest way to set the stage for a discussion of economic crisis is to consider 
the“World” aggregate crisis indices that were introduced in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  
The updated indices are shown in Figure 1 for 1900-2010 (the entry for 2010 reflects data    5
through end-June) and aggregates the performance of 66 countries that account for about 
nine-tenths of world GDP.  The indices are weighted by a country’s share in world GDP.   
Figure 1.  Varieties of crises: World aggregate, 1900-June 2010 
A composite index of banking, currency, sovereign default and, inflation crises, and stock 
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Notes:  The banking, currency, default (domestic and external) and inflation composite (BCDI index) can 
take a value between 0 and 5 (for any country in any given year) depending on the varieties of crises taking 
place on a particular year.  For instance, in 1998 the index took on a value of 5 for Russia, as there was a 
currency crash, a banking and inflation crisis, and a sovereign default on both domestic and foreign debt 
obligations. This index is then weighted by the country’s share in world income.  This index is calculated 
annually for the 66 countries in the sample for 1800-2010:6 (shown above for 1900-onwards).  We have 
added, for the borderline banking cases identified in Laeven and Valencia (2010) for the period 2007-2010. 
In addition, we use the Barro and Ursua (2009) definition of a stock market crash for the 25 countries in 
their sample (a subset of the 66-country sample-except for Switzerland) for the period 1864-2006; we 
update their crash definition through June 2010, to compile our BCDI+ index.  For the United States, for 
example, the index posts a reading of  2 (banking crisis and stock market crash) in 2008; for Australia and 
Mexico it also posts a reading of 2 (currency and stock market crash). 
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While inflation and banking crises predate independence in many cases, a sovereign debt 
crisis (external or internal) is, by definition, not possible for a colony.  In addition, 
numerous colonies did not always have their own currencies.  Thus, the country 
components (without stock market crashes) are compiled from the time of independence 
(if after 1800) onward; the index that includes equity market crashes is calculated based 
on data availability.  The BCDI index stands for banking (systemic episodes only), 
currency, debt (domestic and external), and inflation crisis index. When stock market 
crashes are added to the BCDI composite, we refer to it as the BCDI +. 
A cursory inspection of Figure 1 reveals a very different pattern for the pre- and 
post-WWII experience.  Before World War II, crises episodes were frequent and severe, 
ranging from the banking-crisis-driven “global” panic of 1907 to the debt and inflation 
crises associated with World War II and its aftermath. 
6   
The six decades immediately after the war were not tranquil as they included the 
first oil shocks in the mid-1970s; the debt crises in emerging markets, notably Latin 
America, in the early 1980s; the severe banking crises in the Nordic countries and Japan 
in the early 1990s; and the Asian crisis of 1997-1998.  However, these episodes pale in 
comparison with their pre-war counterparts and with the “global” turmoil that begins in 
2007.  Like its pre-war predecessors, the recent episode is both severe in magnitude and 
global in scope, as reflected by the large share of countries mired in crises.  Stock market 
crashes during 2008-early 2009 have been nearly universal.  Banking crises have 
emerged as asset price bubbles erupted and high degrees of leverage became exposed.  
Currency crashes against the U.S. dollar during 2008 in advanced economies took on 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that Austria, Germany, Italy, and Japan remained in default in varying duration 
after the end of the war.   7
emerging market magnitudes and volatilities.  However, turmoil in Greece and other 
highly indebted European countries notwithstanding, it is evident from the world tally in 
Figure 1 that the dust has begun to settle since the 2007-2008 eruption.  In this paper, we 
quantify some of the longer term characteristics of the post “fall” landscape. 
  Our analysis first focuses on fifteen severe and relatively well known financial 
crises since World War II (Table 1).  Five are considered to be the more severe and 
systemic in advanced economies while the remaining ten befell middle-income emerging 
market economies.  While Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) study the immediate antecedents 
and aftermath of these crises, our emphasis here extends the before-and-after window to 
decades rather than years.  
We also study three global episodes that are dated by defining events which were 
associated with the onset of a considerable amount of economic turmoil across a great 
many countries.  Two of these events originate in the United States, the stock market 
crash of 1929, which ushered in the great depression and the unraveling in the subprime 
mortgage market that began in 2007. The third global shock was the first oil price hike of 
1973 (which also coincides with the break down of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates).  Table 1 defines the coverage of the 10-year windows around these 
events.    
The statistical analysis, which is described in more detail in the appendix, is based 
on nonparametric comparisons of the data that are applied to the episodes listed in 
Table 1.  Simply put, we examine if key macroeconomic indicators seem to come from 
the same distribution before and after a dislocating event.  The exact time periods of the    8
Table 1. Episodes and Coverage 
Region or country  Beginning of 
crisis 
10-year window before 
(t-10 to t-1) 
10-year window after 




    
21 advanced economies and 20  
emerging markets 
1929 1919-1928  1930-1939 
21 advanced economies and 49  
emerging markets 
1973 1963-1972  1974-1983   
22 advanced economies and 49 
emerging markets 
2007 1997-2006  2008-2017 
2 
Country-specific severe financial crises 
Advanced economies      
Spain 1977  1967-1976  1978-1987 
Norway 1987  1977-1986  1988-1997 
Finland 1991  1981-1990  1992-2002 
Sweden 1991  1981-1990  1992-2002 
Japan 1992  1982-1991  1993-2003 
Asian crisis       
Indonesia 1997  1987-1996  1998-2007 
Korea 1997  1987-1996  1998-2007 
Malaysia 1997  1987-1996  1998-2007 
Philippines 1997  1987-1996  1998-2007 
Thailand 1997  1987-1996  1998-2007 
Other emerging markets       
Argentina 2001  1991-2000  2002-2012 
3   
Chile 1981  1971-1980  1982-1991 
Colombia 1998  1988-1997  1999-2008 
Mexico 1994  1984-1993  1995-2004 
Turkey 2001  1991-2000  2002-2012 
3  
      
 
1 The analysis of the global episodes is based on individual country data, not on an aggregation into global 
or regional aggregates. Details about the empirical approach are discussed in part 3 of this Section. 
2 Data is through, 2008, 2009, or 2010, as noted in individual tables and charts, for the particular time 
series.  For instance, the comparison to post 2007 real per-capita GDP is through 2010 for all countries, as 
IMF forecasts for 2010 are used.   
3 Data is through, 2008, 2009, or 2010, as noted in individual tables and charts, for the particular time 
series. 
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before-and-after windows vary across our exercises, but we usually try to employ the 
longest possible spans of comparison. 
The variables of interest to us are those of interest to policy makers and include 
the level and growth or real GDP, the unemployment rate, and inflation. Not all the 
manipulations of the data are used across-the-board for all the time series.  For instance, 
peak-to-trough comparisons are extremely helpful in understanding pre-and post-crisis 
patterns in the level of GDP, housing prices, credit/GDP, etc. but less helpful for 
comparing growth and inflation.  All exercises aim to address the broad question of 
whether the decade after the crisis systematically differs from the decade before it.  In all 
instances, any cross-country or cross-period analysis requires that the data is in similar 
units and comparable. To this end, we work with country-specific annual growth rates 
(percent changes), ratios to GDP, or an index that sets the pre-crisis (t-1) year or the crisis 
year (T) equal to 100. 
 
III. Post-World War II Financial Crises and 2007 
  To set the stage for the analysis, we first turn to the individual country crisis 
episodes and the more recent experience in advanced economies following what began 
with the subprime crisis in the United States in the summer of 2007.  Irrespective of bail-
out costs and swelling government deficits and debts, the most basic measure of the 
severity of a crisis is its impact on the standard of living.  Since the standard of living is a 
multi-faceted concept, we will start with examining the record of per capita GDP in and 
following the crisis.
7 
                                                 
7 Per capita GDP is measured in 1990 international Geary-Kamiris dollars.   10
1.   GDP levels 
  How bad was what just happened to the global economy?  An intuitive metric is 
the level of real GDP in and immediately after the crisis relative to the peak year.  To that 
end, we rebased real GDP in twenty-two advanced economies in the three years from 
2008 to 2010 to their levels in 2007.  For comparability, we took the forecast for the 
levels of real GDP in 2010 from the latest World Economic Outlook of the International 
Monetary Fund (2010).   
The frequency distributions of those 66 annual observations are plotted as the blue 
line in Figure 2.  As is evident from the figure (and the inset box providing summary 
statistics), economic performance has been varied.  Output has been as much as 
13.5 percent below and 2.4 percent above its 2007 value in this country set over the past 
three years.  The red line provides the same calculation for fifteen severe financial crises, 
where the level of GDP for each of the three years following the peak (years t, t+1, and 
t+2) is re-indexed to the value at the peak.   
No doubt as IMF forecasts for 2010 (as of April 2010) are replaced by actual data 
and prior year are revised, this chart will change.  But based on what is available at the 
time of this writing, output declines during the current crisis are comparable to those 
observed during fifteen+ severe post-WWII financial crises.   
The post crisis median is 98 (about 2 percent lower) while upper and lower 
extremes are not far apart.  In effect, the post-2007 output declines for the advanced 
economies are more comparable in orders of magnitude to those observed in emerging 
markets (which account for the lower tail of the t+1 to t+3 distribution).  While 60 
percent of the observations for per capita GDP are below or equal to 100 for the fifteen   11
crises episodes, the comparable figure for 2008 to 2010 is 82 percent. Using a very 
different approach from that adopted here, Laeven and Valencia (2010) reach the same 
conclusion about the severity of the output consequences of the recent episodes versus 
earlier post World War II crises.  These authors compute output losses as the cumulative 
difference between actual and trend real GDP, expressed as a percentage of trend real 
GDP for the period T, t+3.
8 
Figure 2.  Levels of Real Per Capita GDP in the First Three Years of Crises, Fifteen Post-
WWII Episodes and the Second Great Contraction, 2007-2010 
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Sources: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, Maddison (2010, webpage), Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009), and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  The fifteen crises episodes are those listed in Section II.  Figures for real per capita GDP for 2010 
are from the IMF’s April 2010 World Economic Outlook. 
 
                                                 
8 Trend real GDP is computed by applying an HP filter (λ=100) to the GDP series over [T-20, T-1]. 
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Since, as noted earlier, the aim of the paper it to better understand the pre-post crisis 
landscape over longer horizons, we confine our attention to the analysis of the twenty-
one-year window around the fifteen financial crisis episodes of interest and confine most 
of our comparisons to the 1997-to-2006 experience, with more limited reference (as data 
permit) to the world after 2007. 
2. Growth and unemployment  
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) demonstrated that a severe financial crisis typically 
produced an acute disruption of economic activity.  The duration of that fallout matters 
critically for economic welfare.  A short but sharp contraction can be made less 
consequential by private behaviors, such as consumption smoothing by households over 
their lifetimes and production-smoothing by firms, forbearance by regulators to allow 
financial firms to rebuild capital, and government stabilization policies. As the effect 
lingers, it will look more a loss to permanent income and wealth and those mechanisms 
may turn out to be counterproductive.   
We widen the window of the pre- and post-crisis analysis to see how much 
appears temporary and how much is permanent.  Figure 3 examines the marginal 
probability distributions of real per capita GDP growth for the decades bracketing severe 
financial crises for the most severe financial disruptions in advanced economies since 
WWII prior to the most recent, also known as the “Big Five”.  The blue line gives the 
performance in the years before the crisis and the red line gives that after the event.  The 
inset provides basic descriptive statistics for the two distributions.  The note at the bottom 
of the figure reports the Komolgorov-Smirnoff (K-S) critical value (at one percent) for 
the relevant number of observation and the K-S statistic.  Comparable tests were done for   13
the ten emerging market crises combined as well as separately for the subset of five 
Asian crises episodes.   To economize on space and avoid repetition, these figures are not 
reproduced here, but Appendix Table 1 presents the relevant summary and test result 
statistics. 
Figure 3.  Real Per Capita GDP Growth in the Decade Before and the Decade After 
Severe Financial Crises: Post-WWII, Advanced Economies 
 
Probability density function 
Big five: Spain, 1977; Norway, 1987; 
Finland, 1991; Sweden, 1991, Japan 1992
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Sources:  Maddison (2010, webpage), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 1 percent critical value and the K-S statistic are: 16.3 and  28.0, 
respectively. If the K-S is greater than the critical value we reject the null hypothesis that the observations 
are drawn from the same distribution. 
 
Long multi-country time series for unemployment rates are not always readily 
available.  However, the coverage for the twenty-one-year windows around the fifteen 
crises is nearly complete (but for three observations) and the results are provided in 
Figure 4.  The upper panel provides the smoothed histograms of decade comparisons for   14
the “Big Five” countries and the bottom panel presents similar treatment for the five 
Asian economies in the sample.   
Figure 4. Unemployment Rate in the Decade Before and the Decade After Severe 
Financial Crises: Post-WWII, Advanced and Asian Economies 
 
Probability density function, five advanced economies 
Big five: Spain, 1977; Norway, 1987; 
Finland, 1991; Sweden, 1991, Japan 1992
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Probability density function, five Asian economies 
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Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various issues, Nicolau (2005), 
Rosende Ramirez (1990), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and authors”’ calculations. 
 Notes: The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 1 percent critical value and the K-S statistic are: 16.3 and 68.0, 
respectively for the advanced exercise(top panel)  and 16.3 and 35.1 for Asia comparison (bottom panel).     15
The figures require little explanation.  Unemployment rates are significantly 
higher in the years of the decade that follow the crises than in the years of the decade that 
preceded it.  For the advanced economies, the pre- and post-crises medians are 2.7 versus 
7.9 percent, respectively. Indeed, as the cumulative density function highlights (bottom 
panel), nearly all the observations for the post-crisis decade show unemployment rates 
above the median unemployment rate for the t-10 to t-1 period.  The Asian crisis 
comparison does not represent as stark a contrast as that for advanced economies—a 
finding anticipated for a shorter window in the trough-to-peak analysis in Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009).  Unemployment rates are about 1 percentage point higher in the post-
crisis decade. 
The stark difference between the pre- and post-crisis experience raises the 
question as to whether the unemployment rate ever returns to its pre-crisis level (t-1).  
Table 2 provides an answer to this question but requires stretching the post-crisis period 
through the end of 2009.  For ten of the fifteen episodes, the answer to the question is no.  
In the “Big Five” economies, four-of-five Asian-crisis countries, and in Turkey, 
unemployment remains perched at a level above the pre-crises values.  In five cases (the 
Philippines and four Latin American crises), lower unemployment rates do evenutally 
materialize after the crisis.  In those five instances, however, the t-1 benchmark is high 
(from 6.6 to 14.7 percent) by historic norms of those countries.   
   16
Table 2.  Unemployment Rates Before and Long-After Severe Financial Crises:  
Fifteen Post-WWII Episodes  
 
Country and 















  t-1  level year  level?  level  year pre-crisis 
(1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (6)-(2) 
 
Advanced economies 
Spain, 1977  4.8  21.2  1986  no  8.3  2007  3.5 
Norway, 1987  2.0  6.0  1993  no  2.5  2007  0.5 
Finland, 1991  3.4  18.4  1994  no  6.4  2008  3.0 
Sweden, 1991  1.7  9.4  1994  no  4.0  2001  2.3 
Japan, 1992  2.1  5.4  2002  no  3.8  2007  1.7 
 
Emerging economies: The Asian Crisis, 1997 
Indonesia* 4.8  11.2  2005  no  6.1  1999  1.3 
Korea** 2.0  6.8  1998  no  3.2  2008  1.2 
Malaysia 2.5  3.5  1999  no  3.1  2000  0.6 
Philippines 8.6  11.8  2004  yes  7.3  2007  -1.3 
Thailand** 1.1  3.4  1998  no  1.4  2007  0.3 
 
Emerging economies: Other episodes 
Argentina, 2001*  14.7  18.3  2002  yes  7.9  2008  -6.8 
Chile, 1981*  10.7  21.3  1982  yes  7.1  2007  -3.6 
Colombia, 1998  12.1  20.5  2000  yes  11.2  2007  -0.9 
Mexico, 1994**  2.4  4.7  1995  yes  1.6  1999  -0.8 
Turkey, 2001**  6.6  10.5  2003  no  9.9  2006  3.3 
 
Notes: An asterisk (*) indicates a sovereign default (or restructuring) took place during or shortly after that 
episode; a double asterisk (**) are near-default episodes, as defined in Reinhart (2010), where a default was 
avoided with major international assistance. 
Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various issues, Nicolau (2005), 
Rosende Ramirez (1990), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and authors”’ calculations. 
 
It is important to highlight that this study relies of official estimates of 
unemployment, which may underestimate under-employment that tends to rise in the 
years immediately after the crisis.  But even the imperfect measures available show that 
unemployment rates tend to be persistently high and growth rates remain below their 
counterparts in two-decade comparisons.  Providing a full and testable explanation as to 
why crises leave such a long and pronounced trail is beyond the scope of this paper, 
particularly as we are silent on the macroeconomic policy response to the crises.  There 
are, however, two important differences in the pre- and post-crisis landscape that merit   17
further exploration in the remainder of this section.  The first difference is the behavior of 
real estate prices and, by extension, the implications for construction activity.  The 
second is the long cycles that characterize private debt and bank credit, which are a 
central focus of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and Schularick and Taylor (2009).   
3.  The housing market 
The top panel of Figure 5 plots the histogram or frequency distribution for an 
index that sets the level of real housing prices at t-1 equal to 100 for each of the ten 
countries for which real estate market data are available.  The choice of t-1 (rather than T 
as was the case for real GDP) is that housing prices usually begin their descent prior to 
the onset of the crisis and before the economic downturn, as documented in Reinhart and 
Rogoff.  There are a total of 60 annual observations for the advanced economies over the 
11-year period T to t+10.
9  The area under the curve to the left of the vertical line at 100 
gives the share of observations for which real housing prices remained below their t-1 
level. As the chart reveals, about 90 percent of the observations over an eleven-year 
period show real house prices remaining below their level on the eve of crisis (t-1).  
                                                 
9 This is the “advanced economy” category routinely used by the IMF, World Bank, OECD, etc. It is 
questionable in numerous cases whether countries several countries in that list would have classified as 
advanced in the pre-World War II era.   18
Figure 5.  Real House Prices Before and Ten Years After Severe Financial Crises:  
Ten Post-WWII Episodes 
 
Probability density function:  Advanced economies 
Big five: Spain, 1977; Norway, 1987; 
Finland, 1991; Sweden, 1991, Japan 1992
Index, t-1=100 t-1 to t+10
median 83.0
min (Finland, 1993) 58.9
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Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and numerous sources cited therein, and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The five emerging markets for which there is complete real  house price data for the relevant period 
are: Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines.  As shown, there are only a handful of 
observations fully (most notably for Spain)  recovering to their pre-crisis level.   19
Median housing prices are 15 to 20 percent lower in the ten-year post-crisis 
window, with cumulative declines as large as 55 percent.  From 2006 to date, house 
prices have declined, in varying degrees in most advanced economies.  This consistent 
feature of the post-crisis environment is not unique to the more modern crises. While real 
estate price data are not readily available, several chapters in the Annual Reports of the 
League of Nations for the 1930s (the equivalent to the modern-day World Economic 
Outlook from the IMF) were devoted to documenting the collapses in construction as key 
drivers of the abysmal performance of output and employment.
10 As noted in Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009), the housing cycle exhibits a longer duration than booms and busts in 
equity markets and is intimately connected with the multi-year credit cycle, which we 
turn to examine next. 
4. Bank credit and external borrowing  
  Reliance on banks as the main source of credit varies considerably across 
countries, as in many emerging markets domestic capital markets are small and access to 
credit by households is quite uneven.  The importance of banks and bank-like institutions 
(included in the banking surveys) as a source of financing for the corporate sector is the 
smallest in the United States.  Across the countries in the sample, banks play a much 
larger role for households.  Given this variation, we complement the data with other 
sources of indebtedness or leverage, such as external debt or private sector indebtedness 
in capital markets.  
  Table 3 presents the usually long build-up of credit that characterizes the decade 
before the financial crisis and the subsequent unwinding of private debts in the decade 
that follows.  A depiction of these long cycles on a country-by-country basis is presented 
                                                 
10 See the reports for the years, 1938-1940, in particular.   20
along the comparable data for public debt in Reinhart (2010). While our focus remains on 
the twenty-one-year window bracketing the financial crisis, both the surge and 
retrenchment in credit/GDP extends beyond the period of analysis summarized here.
11  
 
Table 3.  Domestic Bank Credit/GDP 10 Years Before and After Severe Financial Crises: 
Fifteen Post WWII Episodes 
 
  Domestic credit surges  Post-crisis deleveraging 
Country and 
 crisis year 
Minimum credit 
ratio in 10 years  
prior to crisis, 
Maximum credit 






Lowest ratio reached 
in the 10 years 





  level year  level year  minimum  level  year  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)=(3)-(1)  (6)  (7)  (8)=(6)-(3) 
 
Advanced economies 
Spain,  1977  65.6  1967 102.5 1976  36.8  94.2  1980  -8.2 
Norway,  1987  130.0 1980 162.4 1988  32.4  123.7  1994  -38.7 
Finland,  1991  46.4 1981 92.9 1991  46.5  54.9  1997  -38.0 
Sweden,  1991  56.1 1985 72.9 1989  16.8  45.0  1996  -27.9 
Japan,  1992  193.8 1982 260.5 1996  66.7  221.9  1997  -38.6 
 
Emerging economies: The Asian Crisis, 1997 
Indonesia*  23.6 1987 62.1 1999  38.4  40.6  2007  -21.5 
Korea**  50.5 1988 64.1 1997  13.6  No  post-crisis  deleveraging  through 
2008 
Malaysia  72.7  1990 163.4 1997  90.7  113.8  2007  -49.6 
Philippines  19.5 1991 78.5 1997  59.0  40.9  2007  -37.7 
Thailand**  84.1  1988 177.6 1997  93.5  104.2  2007  -73.4 
 
Emerging economies: Other episodes 
Argentina,  2001* 22.3 1992 61.9 2002  39.7  23.8  2008  -38.1 
Chile,  1981*  31.1  1971 114.7 1985  83.5  60.5  1991  -53.9 
Colombia,  1998  29.2 1992 42.5 1998  13.2  35.7  2008  -6.8 
Mexico,  1994**  37.3 1990 53.0 1997  15.7  33.2  2005  -19.8 
Turkey,  2001**  22.5 1991 52.7 2001  30.3  41.4  2004  -11.4 
Memorandum item 
Median for 15 episodes        38.4      -37.7 
 
 
Notes: An asterisk (*) indicates a sovereign default (or restructuring) took place during or shortly after that 
episode; a double asterisk (**) are near-default episodes, as defined in Reinhart (2010), where a default was 
avoided with major international assistance.  Italics denote that the deleveraging process is ongoing 
according to the latest available data. 
Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various issues, Norges Bank 
(website), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Reinhart (2010), and authors”’ calculations. 
                                                 
11 Our data for domestic bank credit/GDP is confined to the post-WWII period, with the series beginning 
usually in the late 1940s for the advanced economies and somewhat later for the emerging markets.   21
Table 3 provides a measure of the amplitude of the credit cycle for each crisis episode as 
well as the duration (in years) of the surges and reductions in credit/GDP. 
Figure 6 focuses on the amplitude of the fluctuations.  The top bar measures the 
increase in domestic credit/GDP from the minimum credit ratio in the 10-year window 
prior to the crisis (often the date for this minimum turns out to be t-10) to the maximum 
value reached usually shortly before, during or shortly after the financial crisis.
12  
(Column 5 of Table 3 presents the relevant calculation.) 
As is evident, the increases in credit/GDP in the run-up to the crisis vary in size, 
with surges in the 80-to-90 percent range before the crisis in Chile (1981) and Thailand 
(1997); among the advanced economies, Japan (1992) holds the record, with an increase 
of about 70 percent.
13  The median rise in domestic bank credit/GDP across these 
episodes is about 38 percent.  Quite often, this leverage ratio continues to increase 
immediately after the crisis, despite the fact that a credit crunch is underway.  During this 
stage of the crisis, sharp declines in nominal GDP (not matched by comparable write-
downs in outstanding credits) importantly account for increases in the ratio of credit to 
GDP.  Typically, the greater the unwillingness (or inability) to write down nonperforming 
debts, the longer the deleveraging process is delayed.
14  This pattern is most evident in 
post-crisis Japan, where credit/GDP continues to climb until 1996, peaking at 260.5 
percent.   
                                                 
12 Korea is an exception, in that the secular rise in domestic credit/GDP is largely uninterrupted by the 
1997-1998 crisis.  This pattern is very different from the very clear pre-crisis boom and post-crisis bust in 
external debt/GDP for Korea during the same period. 
13 In effect, the rapid rise in leverage pre-dates our 10-year window, which begins in 1982 for Japan. 
14 In Mexico, for example, poorly defined consumer rights delayed the adjustment in the mortgage market 
following the 1994-1995crisis.   22
Figure 6.  Domestic Banking Credit/GDP Twenty-one Years Around Severe Financial 

















































































Sources:  Table 3 and sources and authors’ calculations listed therein. 
Notes:  The magnitude of credit booms shown correspond to the difference between the maximum 
domestic bank credit-GDP ratio around the crisis and the pre-crisis low for the ratio during the 10-year 
window preceding the crisis.   Similarly the extent of deleveraging is calculated as the minimum 
credit/GDP ratio reached during the 10-year window after the crisis and the maximum ratio reached around 
the crisis.  The specific dates and magnitudes for each episode are listed in Table 3.   
For Korea, there is an uninterrupted secular rise in domestic bank credit-to-GDP during 1987-2007 (the 10-
year window around the crisis).  Post-crisis deleveraging appears to be confined to external debts (see 
Reinhart, 2010).   23
 The median duration (in years) of these credit booms, as shown in Figure 7, is 
about 10 years.  The unwinding or deleveraging following a crisis (shown in the lower 
bars) is of comparable magnitude.  Indeed, the median decline in credit/GDP is also about 
38 percent.  This unwinding also stretches over many years--often a full decade (and even 
longer).  We cannot discriminate from this analysis whether the retrenchment in credit 
arises primarily from financial institutions inability or unwillingness to lend after the 
crisis or from weak demand for loans associated with slower economic growth and 
greater resource slack.  The surge in credit does appear to fuel growth in the pre-crisis 
decade, while its contraction following the crisis no doubt contributes to the subpar 
performance in the macroeconomic aggregates and in real estate prices in the decade that 
follows.   24
Figure 7.  Domestic Banking Credit/GDP Ten Years Before and Ten Years After Severe 











































































Sources:  Table 3 and sources and authors’ calculations listed therein. 
Notes:  The duration of credit booms shown correspond to the difference (in years) between the maximum 
domestic bank credit-GDP ratio around the crisis and the pre-crisis low for the ratio during the 10-year 
window preceding the crisis.   Similarly the duration of the deleveraging phase is calculated as the number 
of years between the year minimum credit/GDP ratio reached during the 10-year window after the crisis 
and the year maximum ratio reached around the crisis.  The specific dates and magnitudes for each episode 
are listed in Table x.  Shown in italics are the episodes where leveraging (Korea) or deleveraging process is 
ongoing according to the latest available data. 
For Korea, there is an uninterrupted secular rise in domestic bank credit-to-GDP during 1987-2007 (the 10-
year window around the crisis).  Post-crisis deleveraging appears to be confined to external debts (see 
Reinhart, 2010). 
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5. Housing prices, bank credit, and external borrowing cycles around the 2007 crisis  
  We now document the similarities in the decade prior to the 2007 crisis in most 
advanced economies (and, most markedly, in those countries that have experienced the 
most severe crises) to the boom in housing prices, domestic bank credit, and external 
borrowing in the fifteen systemic crises episodes covered in this study.  Furthermore, by 
the standard of prior crises, the unwinding of housing prices and domestic and external 
debt is far from complete. 
  Table 4 provides evidence on selected advanced economies for 1997 to 2010.  
The data include real changes in housing prices, domestic bank credit/GDP, gross 
external debt/GDP, and real per-capita GDP growth.  The period is broken up into pre-
crisis (1997 to 2007) and post-crisis (2007 to 2010) sub-samples.  The table also provides 
information on the starting point of the banking crisis in each country, an assessment of 
its scale (in terms of whether it is considered systemic or borderline), and median per-
capita GDP growth for 1950-1996 and its difference from the 1997-2007 median.
15  As a 
useful scheme for summarizing the upswing of the leverage cycle, we average the change 
in the ratios of domestic credit/GDP and gross external debt/GDP (columns 6 and 8)  for 
the pre-crisis decade (column 10) and rank the countries in ascending order by the 
magnitude of the surge in leverage. 
  On the whole, the countries at the bottom of the table with the largest increases in 
leverage (whether domestic, external or both) had larger increases in real housing prices 
and per capita GDP growth versus its long-run trend than those at the top.  Without 
exception, the countries in the bottom group ended up with a full-fledged systemic 
                                                 
15 See Caprio and Klingbiel (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Laeven and Valencia (2010) on the 
systemic/borderline differentiation.   26
banking crisis.  Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain , and the U.K. all fit this 
description, but the U.S. does not quite meet the above-trend GDP growth criteria.  
Greece’s private debt accumulation is not among the largest in the set but, then again, its 
recent troubles had more to do with high public debt. 
The downturn in housing prices and banking solvency begins earlier (2007) in 
Iceland, Ireland, the U.K. and the U.S., but even in these cases there is either scant or no 
evidence of deleveraging through 2010.  In effect, in most countries, credit/GDP and 
external debt/GDP have continued to climb since 2007, as Figure 8 illustrates.  Not unlike 
the crises episodes studied here, part of the continued upward march in debt/GDP owes to 
marked declines in real and even nominal GDP during the height of the crisis and part of 
it to forbearance.  Missing from Figure 8 is the bottom panels of Figures 6 and 7, which 
document the magnitude and duration of the deleveraging phase of the cycle which has in 
nearly all cases followed the boom. 
If the protracted unraveling of private debt (coupled with a high public debt 
burden) unfolds in the same pattern as previous crises, one can infer that this would exert 
a dampening influence on employment and growth, as in the decade following earlier 
crises. 
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Table 4. Housing Prices, Credit, External Debt and Growth: Selected Advanced 
Economies, 1997-2010 
 
Country  Banking crisis  Change in  Change in  Change in  Average  Median per capita 










      1997- 2007- 1997- 2007- 2003- 2007-  6  &  8  1950- 1997 Difference 
      2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010    1996 2010   
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Japan     -30.1  -2.4  -8.9  17.5  8.4  -1.7 -0.3 4.7  1.6  -3.1 
Germany 2008  systemic  -11.1  -0.1  -12.4  6.0  17.8  -4.6  2.7 3.2  1.7  -1.5 
Austria  2008  borderline  5.6 13.4 -4.9 11.1 54.0 -9.3  24.6 3.3  2.4  -1.0 
Finland     51.1  2.3 30.3 13.2 17.8 31.3  24.1 2.7  3.6  1.0 
Italy     35.3  0.6 39.6 12.3 24.1 -4.5  31.9 3.4  1.6  -1.8 
Greece 2008 borderline  88.6  -9.3 31.5  4.4 41.4 25.1  36.5 3.3  4.0  0.6 
Belgium  2008  systemic  101.2 2.3  -7.0 4.5  85.7  68.9  39.3 2.7  2.5  -0.2 
France  2008  borderline  111.6  -11.6  21.0 6.1  58.9 5.6  40.0 3.0  1.8  -1.3 
Switzerland  2008  borderline 9.9 1.4 7.8 5.9  86.1  -102  47.0 2.3  2.0  -0.3 
Denmark  2008 systemic 79.7  -19.8 60.9 18.5 43.3 14.3  52.1 2.0  1.8  -0.2 
Sweden  2008  borderline  114.9 2.8  84.8 9.1  39.4  43.7  62.1 2.4  3.0  0.6 
Portugal  2008  borderline  n.a. -5.5 81.4 33.5 44.0  -21.5  62.7 4.2  1.5  -2.6 
Netherlands  2008 systemic 74.1 -6.6 54.1 46.4 74.8 29.5  64.4 2.3  2.9  0.6 
US
1  2007 systemic 86.5  -23.4 21.7  8.5 33.0 -1.3  27.4 2.5  2.1  -0.4 
        98.4 -48.0     65.7      
Spain  2008 systemic  118.5  -16.6 95.4 31.3 48.9 14.4  72.2 3.1  3.5  0.4 
UK 2007  systemic 150.1 -16.0  66.1  48.0 111.9  8.3  89.0 2.3  2.6  0.3 
Ireland 2007  systemic 114.8 -23.1 107.5  31.1 407.2 169.8  257.3 2.8  5.0  2.1 
Iceland
2  2007  systemic  66.9 -32.1 234.2 -66.9 511.0 428.0  372.6 3.1  3.4  0.4 
M e m o r a n d u m   i t e m s :               
Median     79.7 -6.0 46.9 11.7 46.4  6.9  49.5 2.9  2.4  -0.5 
Average     68.0  -8.0  54.4 10.2 94.9 30.0  74.7 3.0  2.6  -0.4 
                  
                  
Sources: Flow of Funds, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, International Financial Statistics and 
World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund,  Laeven and Valencia (2010), Maddison (2004 and 
website), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Quarterly External Debt Statistics, World Bank and Data Appendix 
for the multiple listings for real estate prices and authors’ calculations.  
Notes:  The data appendix provides a listing of the coverage of real estate prices and domestic credit.  The 
external debt data is through 2010:Q1. 
1 For the U.S., we report bank credit but the more relevant concept (as banks do not play nearly as big a role 
as in other advanced economies) is private debt from the flow of funds. Beginning in 2010:Q1, almost all 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage pools are consolidated in Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s balance 
sheets and, thus, are included in the debt of government enterprises; this shows up a massive private 
deleveraging (about 27 percent of GDP) in Q1.  Absent this shift inliabilities, the deleveraging since 2007 
is closer to 20 percent of GDP. 
2 The credit boom ends in 2006, so the changes reported is 1997-2006 and 2006-2009, as no bank credit 
data for 2010 is available. 
3 For most countries, real housing prices peak in 2007. For the US the peak is 2006, so the 1997-2006 
change is 115.3 percent and the 2007-2010 decline is -33.3 percent.   28
Figure 8.  Domestic Banking Credit/GDP and Financial Crises : Amplitude of the Boom 






























































Sources: Table 4 and sources cited therein. 
Notes: The median rise  in credit GDP in fifteen post-war severe financial crisis is about 38 percent, well 
below the 59 percent surge prior to the current crisis; with the exceptions of Iceland and the US, where the 
crises unfolded earlier, there is little evidence of deleveraging. 
 
IV. Global Episodes: 1929 and 1973 
 
  This section offers comparisons between the pre- and post-crisis landscape around 
the 1929 stock market crash at the onset of the Great Depression and the first oil shock of 
1973, which about doubled oil prices and coincided with stock market crashes in most of 
the advanced economies and numerous emerging markets. 
16  Some of the results confirm 
well-known stylized facts.  Other findings are more novel and have potential implications 
for the coming decade. 
                                                 
16 The 1929 dividing line as the onset of the Great Depression for the U.S. has been convincingly argued in 
Romer (1990); our data on equity markets and output in advanced and many emerging markets offers, 
together with  sparse data on consumer durable spending from the League of Nations (various issues), 
broad support for this dating.   29
1. Decline and recovery: Per capita GDP levels 
  The top panel of Figure 9 plots the frequency distribution for an index that sets 
the level of real per capita GDP in 1929 equal to 100 for each country.  There are a total 
of 210 annual observations for 21 “now-advanced” economies over the 10-year period 
1930-1939.
17  The area under the curve to the left of the vertical line at 100 gives the 
share of observations for which GDP remained below its 1929 level. As the casual 
inspection of the chart reveals, about one half of the entries show income levels that are 
below that of 1929.     
The bottom panel displays the same concept for the post-1973 oil shock.  Not 
surprisingly, the stark collapse in income levels of the Depression is nowhere close to 
replicated in the less-than-spectacular 1970s.  Less than 6 percent of the observations 
during 1974-1983 lie below the 1973 output level.  The worst reading in post-1973 is 
92.3 (a cumulative decline of about 8 percent) compared to 65.4 (a cumulative income 
collapse of about 35 percent).  Median income levels were about 10 percent higher during 
the post-oil shock decade as compared to median income levels about 2 percent lower 
during the 1930s. 
                                                 
17 This is the “advanced economy” category routinely used by the IMF, World Bank, OECD, etc. It is 
questionable in numerous cases whether countries several countries in that list would have classified as 
advanced in the pre-World War II era.   30
Figure 9.  Levels of Real Per Capita GDP in the Twenty Years around Global Shocks:   
The 1929 Crash and the 1973 Oil Shock 
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Sources:  Maddison (2004 and webpage), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and authors’ calculations.   31
2.  Growth 
  A separate but related “cost of the crisis” is whether GDP growth following the 
crisis is comparable in the decades prior and following the crisis.  This question is 
particularly pertinent  to ongoing concerns about whether the post-subprime decade will 
be characterized by a “new-normal” associated with lower potential output growth for the 
advanced economies.
18 
  Figure 10 plots the marginal probability distributions (top panel) for the pre-crisis 
and the post-crisis decade. The inset provides basic descriptive statistics for the two 
distributions.  The note at the bottom of the figure reports the Komolgorov-Smirnoff 
1 percent critical value for the relevant number of observation and the K-S statistic.  
Adding to the precipitous output declines at the outset of the Great Depression, median 
growth rates for the entire decade of the 1930s for the advanced economies is 1.8 percent 
versus 3 percent for the 1920s.  
The gap in pre-and post-1929 growth rates is even greater for the twenty 
emerging economies for which we have output data, with a median of 2.9 percent versus 
0.7 percent in the 1930s (see Appendix Figure 1).  
                                                 
18 El Erian (2008).   32
Figure 10.  Real Per Capita GDP Growth in the Decade Before and the Decade After the 
Onset of the Great Depression, 1929 and the First Oil Shock, 1973 
 










































Sources:  Maddison (2004 and webpage), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 1 percent critical value and the K-S statistic are: 7.98 and 15.5, 
respectively for the 1929 exercise(top panel)  and 7.95 and 37.6 for 1973 comparison (bottom panel).  If the 
K-S statistic is greater than the critical value we reject the null hypothesis that the observations are drawn 
from the same distribution.   33
  The bottom panel of Figure 10 presents the comparable exercise for the 1973 oil 
shock.  It is noteworthy that, despite the fact that income levels were higher for 94 
percent of the observations and median income levels were about 10 percent higher, 
during 1974-1983 growth rates were significantly lower after the shock.  Indeed, the 
slowdown in growth exceeds that of the Great Depression.  For the advanced economies, 
median growth rates during 1974-1983 were about the same as the 1930s but these came 
off a far more robust growth performance (with a median of 4 percent) in the decade 
ending in 1972.  There is a significant decline in the volatility of GDP growth for nearly 
all advanced economies versus the pre WWII sample. 
 
V. Inflation 
Thus far, we have shown that real per capita GDP growth has been consistently 
lower following the adverse shocks of: 1929, 1973, and fifteen country-specific financial 
crises.  The more immediate output costs (in terms of declines in GDP levels during the 
first three years of the crisis, t+1 to t+3) were by far greatest for the Depression of the 
1930s, followed by the 2007 crisis, followed by the fifteen post-World-War-II crises.  
The smallest declines were recorded in the wake of the 1973 oil shock.  All these 
episodes, except the last one, involved a major domestic financial crisis and a boom-bust 
real estate and credit cycle of varying degrees. 
19 
Applying our methods to the inflation data does not yield uniform results across these 
experiences.  Figure 11 presents the familiar histograms comparing the decade prior  
                                                 
19 We do not have complete time series for the depression episode to replicate our empirical exercises on 
housing and unemployment, but the League of Nations publications do provide a rich volume of cross-
country information, so as to fit together this panorama (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, Chapter 16). On 
credit prior to WWII also see Schularick and Taylor (2009).   34
Figure 11.  Inflation in the Decade Before and the Decade After 1929 the Onset of the 
Great Depression, 1929 and the First Oil Shock, 1973 
 











































Sources:  World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund (various issues), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009), and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 1 percent critical value and the K-S statistic are: 8.05 and 18.06, 
respectively for the 1929 exercise(top panel)  and 7.95 and 61.9 for 1973 comparison (bottom panel).If the 
K-S is greater than the critical value we reject the null hypothesis that the observations are drawn from the 
same distribution.   35
to the crises to the one that followed.   The inflation performance difference between 
post-1929 and post-1973 could not be more disparate.  There are no surprises here, as this 
inflation performance of these eras is well-known and documented.  Median inflation 
falls to 0.4 percent after 1929.  Indeed, nearly one-half of the observations for the 21 
advanced economies during 1930-1939 record deflation.  Turning to the oil shock, 
median inflation during 1963-1972, which was already high by historical standards, more 
than doubles to over 10 percent following the surge in oil prices.  Deflation is not even 
part of this picture.   
A less well-known stylized fact are the patterns documented in Figure 12, which 
plot the frequency distributions for the pre- and post-crisis decades inflation for the five 
advanced economy (top panel) and five Asian (bottom panel) crises.  While the 
remaining five emerging market crises are not plotted here (descriptive statistics are 
provided in Appendix Table 1), this group also records a decline in inflation rates 
following the financial crises.  In light of the considerable heterogeneity in monetary and 
fiscal policies adopted in response to the crisis the homogeneity of these results across the 
five advanced economies, five the emerging Asian economies, and the chronic and high 
inflation group (four Latin American countries and Turkey) this result is quite 
remarkable.
20  This is all the more remarkable considering that the emerging market 
countries all sustained massive devaluations/depreciations in their currencies at the height 
of the economic turmoil which extends into t+1. 
                                                 
20 See Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) for an analysis of monetary and fiscal policy during the Depression. 
The study highlights the heterogeneity of the policy response across countries.  See also Claessens et. al. 
(2010) and Laeven and Valencia (2010) for full description of the multifaceted policy responses to financial 
crises from the 1970s to the current episode.   36
 
Figure 12.  Inflation in the Decade Before and the Decade After Severe Financial Crises: 
Post WWII, Advanced and Asian Economies 
Probability density function, five advanced economies  
Big five: Spain, 1977; Norway, 1987; 
Finland, 1991; Sweden, 1991, Japan 1992
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Asian crisis, 1997: Indonesia, Korea,
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 Sources:  World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund (various issues), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009), and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 1 percent critical value and the K-S statistic are: 16.3 and 48.0, 
respectively for the advanced exercise(top panel)  and 16.3 and 28.0 for Asia comparison (bottom panel).   37
The post-crisis disinflation of these episodes does not match the extreme of the 
1930s deflation, but it is equally significant (from a statistical and quantitative 
standpoint). 
21  Thus, the exception on the inflation performance is the oil shock case, 
which also differs from the depression and the financial crisis episodes, in that there is no 
evidence of a credit boom-deleveraging cycle during the 21-year window around 1973. 
22 
 
VI. Policy Reflections 
Large destabilizing events, such as those analyzed here, evidently produce 
changes in the performance of key macroeconomic indicators over the longer term, well 
after the upheaval of the crisis is over.  There is little good news to be found in the result 
that income growth tends to slow and unemployment remains elevated for a very long 
time after a severe shock.   The human temptation to credit good fortune to good 
character and bad results to bad luck further complicates matters.  A ubiquitous pattern in 
policy pitfalls has been to assume negative shocks are temporary, when these were, in 
fact, subsequently revealed to be permanent (or, at least, very persistent).   
Misperceptions can be costly when made by fiscal authorities who overestimate revenue 
prospects and central bankers who attempt to restore employment to an unattainably high 
level.  Many past policy mistakes across the globe and over time can be traced to not 
recognizing in a timely basis that such changes have taken place.
23   
                                                 
21 As shown in Figure 3 (inset), the median inflation rate for 1919-1928 for 21 advanced economies was 
1.3—placing it at the doorstep of deflation. 
22 During 1963-1983 there is a secular rise in credit/GDP of modest magnitude in most advanced 
economies. These results are not reported here, but are available from the authors. 
 
23 Orphanides (2001) provides an exposition of a classic policy misperception—the Federal Reserve’s 
failure to recognize the slowing of productivity after the oil shock.   38
What we observe, of course, is an association.  Growth falls and the 
unemployment rate remains high after a severe economic dislocation.  That observation, 
itself, is not informative as to the balance between changes in aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply. 
The outcome could materialize as a consequence of the failure of policy makers to 
provide sufficient stimulus after a wrenching event in an economy where rigidities give 
ample scope to demand management.  An important role for credit in supporting 
spending might imply that an associated collapse in financial intermediation lengthens 
and deepens the downturn (with the unavailability of credit serving as the propagating 
mechanism discussed in Bernanke, 1983).  In such circumstances, slow growth might be 
a self-fulfilling prophecy produced by timid authorities who neither supported spending 
nor dealt with the capital-adequacy problems of key financial institutions.   
Economic contraction and slow recovery might also feed back on the prospects 
for aggregate supply.  A sustained stretch of below-trend investment and depreciation of 
human capital prompted by elevated and lengthy spells of unemployment could hit the 
level and growth rate of potential output.  The unemployment rate stays high because it 
has been high, exhibiting hysteresis as described by Blanchard and Summers (1986). 
The forcing mechanism for a reduction in aggregate supply might be policy itself.  
In adverse economic circumstances, political leaders sometimes grasp for quick fixes that 
impair, not improve, the situation.  Included in the list of such interventions are 
restrictions on trade (both domestically and internationally), work rules and pay practices, 
and the flow of credit.  The output effects of crises might be persistent because we make 
them so, in the manner posited for the Great Depression by Cole and Ohanian (2002).   39
Or, changed prospects after a crisis might reflect the correction of outsized 
expectations that fed the prior boom.  If, for instance, investors grossly overestimated the 
possibilities for productivity improvement from a new technology, they might bid up 
asset prices, borrow against future anticipated income, and invest in myriad capital 
projects in an unsustainable manner.  Chancellor (2000) casts many episodes of financial 
euphoria and ensuing crash over the centuries in exactly this sequence, from the diving 
bell, through the steam engine, to the radio, and thereafter.  Spending advances rapidly on 
hope, and, on reality, contracts, and then recovers only slowly.  Recent discussions about 
the “new normal” in reference to the post-crisis landscape leave the impression that the 
pre-crisis environment was “normal.”  In fact, there are reasons to believe that the pre-
crisis decade set a high-water mark distorted by a variety of forces.  We have presented 
evidence here that many of those patterns are reversed not only in the immediate vicinity 
of the crisis, (as Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 show), but also over longer horizons that span 
several years.
24 
For whatever the initiating change, the real interest rate consistent with full 
employment of resources presumably falls as a consequence of slower economic growth.   
The logic is that households need less inducement to defer consumption when future 
consumption prospects are bleaker.  In addition to the fall-out of a lower real interest rate 
on asset prices, monetary policy makers need to reconsider the benefits of an inflation 
buffer to protect from the zero lower bound to nominal interest rates.  If real GDP growth 
has permanently tilted down as a consequence of a severe economic dislocation, or at 
least has done so in a time frame measured by decades, fiscal authorities face lower 
                                                 
24 This also fits the pattern of adjustment after an inflow of foreign capital, or what Reinhart and Reinhart 
(2008) refer to as a “capital flow bonanza.”   40
prospects for revenue and higher pressure on outlays.  Similarly, the apportioning of the 
current budget stance into its cyclical and structural components will shift with changes 
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Appendix:  Data and Methodology 
Unless otherwise noted, the pre- and post-crises decades (which forms a 21-year 
window centered on the crisis year) in our analysis are those defined in Table 1. Any 
departure from this coverage owes to lack of data and is noted accordingly.   
Statistical analysis 
  The first benchmark exercise is to pool the data across countries into two groups, 
the pre-crisis decade (t-10 to t-1) and the post crisis period (t+1 to t+10).  The probability 
distributions (marginal and cumulative) are tabulated enabling simple comparisons for 
per capita GDP growth, unemployment and inflation through standard statistical tests, 
such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff (K-S) for the pre-and post-crisis decades. The null 
hypothesis of the K-S test is that the observations for the two sub-periods are drawn from 
a common population.  
  The second type of exercise, applied to the level of real per capita GDP and real 
housing prices examines the marginal and cumulative probability distribution of these 
time series during (t+1 to t+10) relative to the benchmark level at the time of (T) or just 
prior (t-1) to the crisis. These calculations are informative on two grounds: first, it 
provides a glimpse into the duration of the shock, if there is a high share of observations 
below the initial level; second, it is also informative as to the magnitude of the initial 
decline or collapse in the series, as the 1929 and 1973 comparisons discussed in the 
following section make plain. 
  Third, to examine the cycle in credit, external debt, and real housing prices, we 
calculate on a country-by-country and (importantly) series-by-series basis the peak-to-
trough calculations, as in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  The calculations facilitate an   43
assessment the amplitude and duration of upswings and downturns in the cycle of the 
indicator in question.  The dating of these cycle turning points also facilitates 
comparisons across markets and indicators, as even when we have a well-grounded 
dating system for recessions and recoveries  (for example that of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research for the United States) synchronicity in cycles across sectors and 
indicators is not the norm. 
  This approach to the comparisons of the pre and post-crisis landscape is not 
without limitations.  A pure before- and after-crisis comparison with a ten-year window is 
bound to be clouded by other important events that influence economic outcomes in such 
a long horizon before or after the crisis.  At the individual country analysis comparable 
issues arise.  For the five advanced economy episodes and the five Asian crisis episodes it 
is reasonable to state that the pre-crisis decade was one of relative “economic tranquility” 
and even prosperity. For the four Latin American and the Turkish crises listed in Table 1 
a comparable statement cannot be made. Chile was mired in economic and political 
turmoil in the mid-1970s (the half point in the t-10 to t-1 window), while Argentina, 
Mexico and Turkey grappled with high (three-digit) inflation rates in the decade prior to 
the respective crises studied here.  The 1919-1928 window prior to the 1928 crash 
captures the immediate aftermath of war while the tail end of the 1930-1939 episode 
capture the preparation for the next war.
25   The post-1973 oil shock sample includes 
another major subsequent shock.   
                                                 
25 This is most evident in the GDP and particularly unemployment data for Germany and Japan.   44
  Even a twenty-one-year window may not fully cover the very long debt and credit 
cycles.
26  The build-up in debt in Japan (among others)  prior to the onset of the banking 
crisis in 1992 pre dates the ten-year window beginning.  The post-crisis deleveraging 
(domestic and external debts) in countries like Chile (1981) and Indonesia (1997) lasted 
past the 10-year benchmarks of 1991 and 2007, respectively.
27 
  Some crises begin early in the calendar year while others begin much later; in the 
later case, the year t+1 may also reasonably classify as a crisis year.  To deal with these 
cases, perform sensitivity analysis that compares (t-10 to t-1) to (t+2 to t+11).  Unless 
otherwise noted, these results not are appreciably different from the core exercise 
described above. 
Data and country coverage 
  The primary time series we cover in our analysis are per-capita GDP levels and 
rates of growth, unemployment rates, inflation, real housing prices, domestic bank 
credit/GDP, external debt/GDP, and real housing prices. The coverage is not uniform 
across countries for all the episodes in question, so particulars are given for each exercise.  
The greatest amount of detail is provided for the fifteen individual crises episodes listed 
in Table 1 and for the 2007 crisis case.  For the global episodes, the data covers 21 or 22 
advanced economies, listed already in the Introduction, and 20 emerging markets for the 
Great Depression episodes and 49 emerging markets. 
 
                                                 
26 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) , Reinhart (2010) and Schularick and Taylor (2009) for a documentation 
of these “long cycles.” 
27 Table 3 provides sufficient information to pinpoint which cycles exceeded the time-frame boundaries 
imposed in this study.   45
Appendix Table 1.  Summary of Pre- and Post-Crisis Descriptive Statistics and 




Median  Minimum  Maximum  K-S Statisitic  1% critical 
values 
 
Pre- and post- 1929 comparisons of real per capita GDP growth 
21 “Now-advanced” Economies  
1919-1928 3.0  -17.5  33.9     
1930-1939 1.8  23.0  17.8  15.5  7.98 
20 Emerging Economies 
1919-1928 2.9  -15.2  27.7     
1930-1939 0.7  -22.5  34.7  12.2  7.72 
Pre- and post- 1973 oil shock comparisons of real per capita GDP growth 
21 Advanced Economies  
1963-1972 4.0 -6.0  11.7     
1974-1983 1.8 -7.5 6.5  37.6  7.95 
48  Emerging Economies 
1963-1972 3.0  -18.0  27.0     
1974-1983 2.2  -37.2  14.7 14.6  5.26 
Pre-(t-10 to t-1) and post-(t+1 to t+10) severe post WWII financial crisis 
Advanced economies, the Big Five 
Comparisons of real per capita GDP growth
t-10 to t-1  3.1  -0.7  7.9     
t+1 to t+10  2.1  -4.3  5.9  28.0  16.3 
Comparisons of the unemployment rate
t-10 to t-1  2.7  1.1  6.1     
t+1 to t+10  7.9  2.5  21.2  68.0  16.3 
Five Asian crisis, 1997episodes 
Comparisons of real per capita GDP growth
t-10 to t-1  6.6  -2.8  11.7     
t+1 to t+10  3.8  -14.4  8.7  54.0  16.3 
Comparisons of the unemployment rate
t-10 to t-1  2.9  1.1  9.8     
t+1 to t+10  3.7  1.4  11.8  35.06  16.55 
All countries 
Comparisons of real per capita GDP growth
t-10 to t-1  3.8  -14.4  11.7     
t+1 to t+10  3.2  -15.1  8.7  18.61  9.51 
Comparisons of the unemployment rate
t-10 to t-1  3.7  1.1  18.7     
t+1 to t+10 
 
7.8 1.4 21.3     
Sources: See Data Appendix for sources and the countries included in the 1929 and 1973 comparisons. The 
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Appendix Table 2:  Data Coverage  









Real per capita 
GDP  through 
2010. Start date 
2007 crisis analysis, latest observation 
Austria 2010:Q1  2010:M5  2003:Q4-2010:Q1  1918 
Belgium 2009:Q4 2010:M5  2003:Q4-2010:Q1  1918 
Denmark 2010:Q1  2009:M8 2003:Q1-2009:Q4  1918 
Finland 2010:Q1  2010:M5  2002:Q1-2010:Q1  1918 
France 2010:Q1  2010:M5  2002:Q4-2010:Q1  1918 
Germany 2010:M6 2010:M5 2001:Q4-2010:Q1  1918 
Greece 2010:Q1  2010:M5 2003:Q2-2010:Q1 1918 
Iceland 2010:M6  2008:M8  1923-2010:Q1 1918 
Ireland 2010:Q1  2010:M5  2002:Q4-2010:Q1  1921 
Italy 2009:H1  2010:M5  2001:Q4-2010:Q1  1918 
Japan 2010:M4  2009:M5  2003:Q1-2010:Q1  1918 
Netherlands 2010:M6  2010:M5  2003:Q2-2010:Q1  1918 
Norway 2010:M6  2008:M12  2003:Q4-2010:Q1  1918 
Portugal 2010:Q1 2010:M5  2003:Q3-2010:Q1  1918 
Spain 2010:M6  2010:M5  2002:Q4-2009:Q4  1918 
Sweden 2010:Q1  2009:M8  2003:Q3-2010:Q1  1918 
Switzerland 2010:Q1  2010:M4  1999:Q4-2010:Q1  1918 
United Kingdom  2010:M6  2010:M5  2003:Q1-2010:Q1  1918 
United States  2010:Q1  2009:Q4  2009:Q3-2010:Q1  1918 
     Net private debt    2010:Q1 
 
  
fifteen severe financial crisis episodes availability before and after crisis dates 
Argentina, 2001  1981-2007  1960-2008:12  1970-2010:Q1  1918 
Chile, 1981  n.a.  1960-2009:6  1970-2010:Q1  1918 
Colombia, 1998  1997:Q1-2008:Q4  1948-2009:8  1970-2010:Q1  1918 
Finland, 1991  1970-2010:Q1  1948-2010:5  n.a.  1918 
Indonesia, 1997  1994:Q1-2010:Q1  1969-2009:8  1970-2010:Q1  1918 
Japan, 1992  1955:H1-2010:M5  1953-2009:M5  n.a.  1918 
Korea, 1997  1986:M1-2010:M3  1951-2009:M9  1970-2010:Q1  1918 
Malaysia, 1997  1988-2009:Q4  1959-2009:M4  1970-2010:Q1  1918 
Mexico, 1994  n.a.  1948-2009:M8  1970-2010:Q1  1918 
Norway, 1991  1970-2010:M6  1948-2008:M12  n.a.  1918 
Philippines. 1997  1994:Q1-2010:Q1  1948-2008:M2  1970-2010:Q1  1918 
Spain, 1977  1970-2010:M6  1952-2010:5  n.a.  1918 
Sweden, 1991  1970-2010:Q1  1948-2009:M8  n.a.  1918 
Thailand, 1997  1991:Q1-2010:Q1  1948-2009:M8  1970-2010:Q1  1950 




Notes: Inflation is available for all the countries listed above for the full sample covering the Great 
Depression through 2010. 
The advanced economy group for the 1929 and 1973 comparisons is comprised of Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.  The 
2007 analysis also includes Iceland. The 20 emerging markets in the 1929 comparison are: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  In addition to these, 
the subsequent comparisons include another 28 emerging markets that make up the Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009) sample.  
 